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Canarelli v. Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 72 (November 10, 2011)1 
CORPORATE LAW- DISSOLVED CORPORATIONS 
 
Summary 
 
 A petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus challenging the district court’s order to 
force Petitioner to serve as trustee for a dissolved corporation in a construction defect action. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court granted the writ of mandamus, finding that the district court did not have the 
authority to compel the petitioner to serve as director trustee in order to defend the corporation in 
actions that arose post-dissolution of the corporation and after the completion of the winding up 
process.  The Court determined that NRS 78.590 gave no power to director trustees to defend 
actions against the corporations that arise post-dissolution and after the completion of the 
winding up process.  Furthermore, NRS 78.600 does not give the district court authority to 
compel a director trustee of a dissolved corporation whose winding-up process has been 
completed to continue in that position in order to defend against a post-dissolution claim. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 American West Homes, Inc. (“American West”), constructed homes in two residential 
developments in Las Vegas prior to 2004.  On January, 29, 2004, the corporation filed a 
certificate of dissolution according to Nevada law.  After the dissolution, Petitioner was among 
the corporation’s directors that remained as a trustee in accordance with NRS 78.585.  The 
trustees completed the winding up process in March 2008, after they had distributed all the 
assets.   
  
On November 18, 2008, a group of homeowners filed a construction defect complaint 
against American West.  The Petitioner, however, officially resigned as a director trustee on June 
24, 2009.  Not long after, on July 1, 2009, another group of homeowners filed a separate 
construction defect complaint against American West.  Both of the complaints were served on 
Petitioner, who filed motions to quash service and dismiss the complaints, arguing that his duties 
as trustee concluded when the wind-up process was completed.  The district court denied the 
motions and found that service was effective because Petitioner had been an officer and director 
of American West.   
 
The plaintiffs in each suit filed motions to appoint the Petitioner to continue as a trustee 
pursuant to NRS 78.600.  Moreover, they argued that pursuant to Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. 
District Court, post-dissolution claims may be filed indefinitely.2  The district court granted the 
motions to appoint Petitioner as trustee.  Petitioner subsequently filed the writ petition. 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 By Cameron Daw 
2 120 Nev. 575, 584, 97 P.3d 1132, 1138 (2004). 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Hardesty wrote for the unanimous Court sitting en banc.  The Petitioner made 
three different arguments to support his belief that the district court cannot force him to serve as 
a director trustee.  He argued, first, that forcing him to serve as director trustee constitutes 
indentured servitude and violates the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3  
Second, he argued that the Court erred in Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. District Court, when it 
concluded that post-dissolution claims are limited only by the statutes of limitation or repose of 
the underlying claim.4  Finally, he argued that the term “continue” in the text of NRS 78.600 
prevents the district court from appointing a director trustee who resigned from the position.  The 
Court considered these arguments after examining NRS 78.585, 78.590, and 78.600. 
 
 Under Nevada law, NRS 78.585 allows for the continuation of a corporation after 
dissolution for winding up any business.5  Specifically, the statute allows for “prosecuting and 
defending suits, actions, proceedings, and claims of any kind or character by or against it . . . to 
settle and close its business, to collect and discharge its obligations, to dispose of and convey its 
property, and to distribute its assets . . . .”6  Any claim brought against it must arise before 
dissolution and be commenced within 2 years following dissolution.7 
 
 NRS 78.590 proscribes the statutory powers the director trustees have in settling the 
affairs of the corporation.8  Director trustees may “collect the outstanding debts, sell and convey 
the property, real and personal, and divide the money and other property among the stockholders, 
after paying or adequately providing for the payment of its liabilities and obligations.”9  The 
statute is silent as to any power to defend actions against the corporation that arises post-
dissolution and after the winding-up process.10 
 
 The Court noted that the statutes do not provide a definition of what constitutes winding 
up, so in accordance with Nevada case law it used the common definition of the term.11  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “winding up” as “[t]he process of settling accounts and liquidating assets 
in anticipation of a partnership’s or a corporation’s dissolution.”12  Based on this definition, the 
Court concluded that winding up is completed when the director trustees have disposed all assets 
to the shareholders and paid all debts to creditors.  As a result, the Court determined that a 
director trustee’s power to act on behalf of the dissolved corporation ends once the wind-up 
process is complete. 
 
 
                                                            
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1 (“[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States . . 
. .”). 
4 Beazer, 120 Nev. at 584, 97 P.3d at 1138. 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.585 (2007). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.590 (2007). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 McGrath v. State Dep’t. of Pub. Safety, 123 Nev. 120, 123, 159 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). 
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1738 (9th ed. 2009). 
 NRS 78.600, however, does grant the district court authority to continue the service of a 
director trustee in certain situations.13 
 
 “When any corporation organized under this chapter shall be dissolved or cease to 
exist in any manner whatever, the district court, on application of any creditor or 
stockholder of the corporation, at any time, may either continue the directors 
trustees as provided in NRS 78.590, or appoint one or more persons to be 
receivers of and for the corporation, to take charge of the estate and effects 
thereof, and to collect the debts and property due and belonging to the 
corporation, with power to prosecute and defend, in the name of the corporation, 
or otherwise, all such suits as may be necessary or proper for the purposes 
aforesaid . . . .”14 
 
Based on the preceding text, the Court reasoned that the statute allows the district court to 
continue a director trustee so they might exercise their winding-up powers proscribed in NRS 
78.590.  Because NRS 78.590 says nothing about defending post-dissolution claims that were 
unknown prior to completing the winding up process,15 the Court determined that NRS 78.600 
does not confer authority upon the district court to compel a director trustee who has completed 
the winding-up process to continue to serve to defend such suits. 
 
 Because the Petitioner opposed having to continue as director trustee to defend the suit, 
and all of American West’s assets were distributed and its debts paid off, the Court held that the 
district court did not have authority to compel him to do so.  
 
 Finally, the Court declined to overturn its holding in Beazer Homes Nevada Inc. v. 
District Court.  The Court distinguished that case because it dealt with different legal issues.  
Beazer dealt with the applicability of a statute of limitations period for post-dissolution claims, 
not the appointment of a former director trustee to represent the corporation after completion of 
the wind-up process, as was the case here. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 A district court does not have the authority to compel a former director trustee to 
represent a corporation post-dissolution against a suit after completion of the wind-up process.  
NRS 78.600 does give the district court power to continue or appoint a director trustee, but only 
to perform the responsibilities laid out in NRS 78.590.  Finally, Beazer Homes Nevada Inc. v. 
District Court is still good case law as it dealt with the applicability of a statute of limitations for 
post-dissolution claims.        
 
    
 
                                                            
13 NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.600 (2007). 
14 Id. 
15 NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.590 (2007). 
